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Abstract. In multi-prover interactive proofs (MIPs), the verifier is usu-
ally non-adaptive. This stems from an implicit problem which we call
“contamination” by the verifier. We make explicit the verifier contamina-
tion problem, and identify a solution by constructing a generalization of
the MIP model. This new model quantifies non-locality as a new dimen-
sion in the characterization of MIPs. A new property of zero-knowledge
emerges naturally as a result by also quantifying the non-locality of the
simulator.
1 Introduction
An interactive proof is a dialog between two parties: a polynomial-time verifier
and an all-powerful prover [1,2]. They agree ahead of time on some language L
and a string x. The prover wishes to convince the verifier that x ∈ L. If this is
true, the prover should succeed almost all the time; if not, the prover should fail
almost all the time. This is a generalization of the complexity class NP, except
instead of simply being handed a polynomial-sized witness, the verifier is allowed
to quiz the prover. The set of languages that admit an interactive proof is called
IP.
The multi-prover model was introduced in [3]. This model consists of multi-
ple, non-communicating? ? ? provers talking to a single verifier. The inspiration
for this model was that of a detective interrogating a number of suspects, each of
whom is isolated in a separate room. The suspects may share a strategy before
being separated, but once the interrogation begins they are no longer able to talk
to one another. The main motivation for studying this model was to remove the
complexity assumptions used in the commitment schemes. We will abbreviate
“multi-prover interactive proof” as MIP and the set of languages which can be
accepted by MIPs as the boldface MIP.
Implicit in the definition of the multi-prover model (in the original [3]) is
that the provers are local. That is, not only do the provers not communicate,
but they are not correlated in any way beyond sharing random bits.
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of this paper.
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An interactive proof is zero-knowledge if the verifier learns nothing except
the truth of “x ∈ L”. This is usually defined by saying that a distinguisher is
unable to tell apart a real conversation between the prover and the verifier, and
one which is generated by a lone polynomial-time simulator. We will denote sets
of zero-knowledge interactive proofs with a ZK bold prefix.
From a complexity perspective, the zero-knowledge aspect of interactive
proofs is characterized by IP = ZKIP = PSPACE for single-prover IPs
([4,5,6]), and MIP = ZKMIP = NEXP for multi-prover IPs ([3,7,8,9,10,11,12]).
The (conjectured) necessity of complexity assumptions for zero-knowledge in the
single-prover case was the initial motivation for the multi-prover model.
However, there is a relationship between non-locality and zero-knowledge
which remains unexplored. Let us call this the cryptographic characterization
(or perspective) of ZKMIPs.
1.1 A Cryptographic Perspective
The foundation of zero-knowledge is the idea of a simulator, a machine with
no more power than the verifier, which can pretend to be all-powerful provers.
Obviously, this simulator cannot accomplish this task without some kind of ad-
vantage – independent of knowledge – that must be provided. In single-prover
zero-knowledge proofs, this advantage can be in the form of the ability to rewind
computation, to discard failed simulations, or knowledge of a trapdoor in the
commitment scheme. In multi-prover zero-knowledge proofs, the advantage in
existing literature can be summed up as signaling : the simulator, acting as sev-
eral provers, knows secrets which real provers, in a real instance of the protocol,
would not. This is then used to produce the simulation.
This signaling advantage of existing ZKMIP simulators is unnecessarily strong
in the sense that if we were to require the transcript to come from multiple, non-
communicating simulators (as we do with provers in real instances), then existing
simulation strategies would fail (as they would require the simulators to commu-
nicate), whereas we have discovered that there exist simulation strategies which
do not require communication. Instead, we only require some level of non-local
correlation between the simulators. The exact level of correlation required is a
heretofore uncharacterized dimension in interactive proofs.
In order to build the framework necessary to express and characterize this
dimension, we begin with an implicit problem in the existing MIP literature.
1.2 Implicit Problem / Ad Hoc Solution
There is an implicit problem in what we call the “standard” MIP model (one
verifier talking to a number of provers) in the existing literature. As a lead-up to
describing this problem, we invite the readers to consider the following ridiculous
two-prover protocol:
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Protocol 1. ( Ridiculous Protocol )
1. Verifier sends Prover 1 a random string S.
2. Prover 1 replies with a string T .
3. Verifier sends Prover 2 the string T .
4. Prover 2 replies with a string S′.
5. Verifier accepts if S = S′.
Suppose that we claim the following ridiculous theorem:
Theorem 2. (Ridiculous Theorem) The probability that the verifier accepts in
the Ridiculous Protocol is exponentially small.
Proof. (Ridiculous Proof) By the definition of MIPs, the provers cannot com-
municate. If Prover 2 can output an S′ that is the same as the uniformly random
S that only Prover 1 knows, then they must have communicated. Contradiction.
uunionsq
The reader is astute in pointing out that steps 2 and 3 of the Ridiculous
Protocol clearly show that the verifier is helping the provers by relaying the very
answer it is supposed to keep secret. This is the implicit problem, exaggerated.
We will call this implicit problem “contamination” by the verifier. For ex-
ample, a verifier talking to one prover and then talking to another prover risks
unwittingly helping the provers (up to) signal. However, the most important
(and the most subtle) of those contaminations are ones where the verifier helps
the provers perform a no-signaling correlation; examples of this can be found in
the following section, and also in [13].
The ad hoc solution in existing literature is to cripple the verifier so that it
would not do this (and much more). The verifier in existing literature is assumed
to be (or constructed to be) non-adaptive. That is, the verifier essentially chooses
the questions ahead of time. This circumvents the problem of contamination.
However, this is overkill. We can address the problem of contamination with-
out requiring the verifier to be non-adaptive. We do so by constructing a multi-
prover, multi-verifier model which we shall call locality-explicit multi-prover in-
teractive proofs (LE-MIP). MIPs in this form have prover-verifier pairs who
are talking, but no communication between any of the pairs. At the end of a
locality-explicit protocol, a special, read-only verifier accepts or rejects.
Locality-explicit protocols do not have to worry about contamination by
the verifier, therefore they do not need to be non-adaptive. We will show later
that LE-MIPs can be generalized to account for non-locally augmented provers
without resorting to non-adaptive verifiers.
This new model offers the following advantages:
1. The provers and verifiers are guaranteed to be local (i.e., a very strong notion
of no-communicating), if desired.
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2. Any non-local resources of provers and verifiers are made explicit.
3. It is possible to enforce “honest non-locality” on the provers by having the
verifier provide them with non-local resources. Our model makes this ex-
plicit.
The new characterization of ZKMIPs emerges as we naturally extend zero-
knowledge to LE-MIPs, by making explicit the non-local resources of the (mul-
tiple) simulators.
1.3 Our Contributions
– We explain the aforementioned implicit problem with the standard (single-
verifier) MIP model (section 3).
– We describe the locality-explicit model and justify its definition by expanding
on its advantages over the standard model (section 4).
– We show that, in the LE-MIP model, a new, stronger property of zero-
knowledge naturally emerges (section 4.1).
– We describe a protocol which is local-verifier, local-prover and zero-knowledge
which accepts oracle-3-SAT, achieving zero-knowledge without needing the
provers to authenticate any messages, and prove its security (section 5).
– We describe how to simulate the above protocol with simulators which have
only a specific no-signaling advantage (section 5.2).
2 Previous Work
The early work by Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Kilian and Wigderson asserting that
ZKMIP = MIP from [3] and [9] use multi-round protocols and their (honest)
verifiers are inherently signalling. This is precisely why we address the situation
in this work. Proving soundness is quite subtle in this case because the provers
could use the (signalling) verifier to break binding of the commitments. In par-
ticular, soundness will not be valid if the protocol is composed concurrently with
other executions of itself or even used as a sub-routine. In recent conversations
with Kilian [14], we have learned that controlling the impact of this signaling
(via the verifier) has been a concern since the early days of MIPs. The proto-
cols as they are might be sound but it is not fully proven anywhere in writing.
However, it is also clear that no considerations had been given to the fact that
general non-local correlations are possible via the verifier. If soundness rests on
the binding property of a commitment scheme (such as those zero-knowledge
proofs) and this binding property rests on the inability to achieve a certain non-
local correlation then impossibility to achieve this correlation via the verifier
must be demonstrated. It is not done or hinted in these papers.
The multi-round issue we address may seem trivial because it is a known
fact that multi-round MIPs may be reduced to a single round using techniques
of Lapidot-Shamir [15] and Feige-Lovasz [16]. Nevertheless, if interested in zero-
knowledge MIPs, commitment schemes are generally used to obtain the zero-
knowledge property and thus the single-round structure is lost in the process.
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Although single-round protocols bypass verifier’s non-local contamination prob-
lems we describe in this work, converting multi-round protocols into single-round
ones is highly inefficient and complex. Preserving zero-knowledge while achieving
single-round has turned out to be a major challenge. Practically, keeping a multi-
round protocol’s structure, using only commitments to achieve zero-knowledge
is very appealing.
In [15], Lapidot-Shamir proposed a parallel ZKMIP for NEXP, but they re-
moved the zero-knowledge claim in the journal version [17] of their work without
any explanation as of why. Feige and Kilian [10] were the last ones to follow this
approach combining techniques drawn from Lapidot-Shamir [15], Feige-Lovasz
[16] and Dwork, Feige, Kilian, Naor, and Safra, [11] to achieve a “2-prover 1-
round 0-knowledge” proof for NEXP. As far as we can tell, this is the only paper
in the ZKMIP literature that appears to avoid the multi-round problems and
the non-local contamination that we discuss. However, note that the analysis of
[10] is partly based of that of [15], and the journal version of Feige-Kilian [12]
does not contain their prior claim of zero-knowledge either. All other ZKMIPs
for NEXP in the literature are multi-round, and thus our analysis applies to
them.
Similar issues are possible using more recent results such as Ito-Vidick’s
proof [18] that NEXP ⊆MIP∗ and Kalai, Raz and Rothblum’s proof [19] that
MIPns= EXP. The reason why these multi-round constructions may maintain
their soundness despite the potential non-locality contamination (via the verifier)
is the non-adaptive nature of their verifiers. Non-adaptive verifiers cannot take
advantage of information acquired in recent rounds to construct new questions
to the provers: all their questions are pre-established before the interaction with
the provers start. This is a special simpler case of local verifiers. Nowhere in this
large literature can one find a single statement observing the non-adaptiveness
of the verifiers and its importance to guarantee soundness of those MIPs. More-
over, their multi-round structure requires that any straightforward extensions
to ZKMIP∗ or ZKMIPns via commitment schemes be analyzed very carefully
and the locality of the resulting verifiers be re-established. This is part of the rea-
sons why the ZK version did not follow easily. Recently, Chiesa, Forbes, Gur, and
Spooner [20] discovered a proof that NEXP ⊆ ZKMIP∗. Their construction
is based on refinements of Ito-Vidick’s proof and along the lines of Feige-Kilian,
building on algebraic structures to bypass the need of commitment schemes.
Unfortunately, this work is so complicated that we are unable to assess whether
their verifier is actually non-adaptive. And of course, this is not mentioned or
proven anywhere nor available from the authors...
Bellare, Feige, and Kilian [21] considered a multi-verifier model similar to
ours in order to analyze the role of randomness in multi-prover proofs. This is
completely unrelated to our goal of analyzing verifier non-local contamination.
Finally, the notion of relativistic commitment schemes put forward by Kilian
[22] and Kent [23] leads to several results [24,25,26] where a similar multi-verifier
model is necessary in order to assess spatial separation of the provers. The new
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(Non-local) Zero-Knowledge definition is 100% fresh from this work. No prior
work exists at all.
3 The Standard MIP Model
Multi-prover interactive proofs were introduced in [3]. The intuition for their
model was that of a detective interrogating two suspects held in different rooms.
This was formalized as follows:
Definition 1. Let P1, . . . , Pk be computationally unbounded Turing machines
and let V be a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine. All machines have
a read-only input tape, a read-only auxiliary-input tape, a private work tape and
a random tape. The Pi’s share a joint, infinitely long, read-only random tape.
Each Pi has a write-only communication tape to V , and vice-versa. We call
(P1, . . . , Pk, V ) a k-prover interactive protocol (k-prover IP).
This model is essentially equivalent to that of Bell [27] who introduced his
famous Bell’s inequality to distinguish local parties from entangled parties.
Zero-knowledge MIPs were also defined in [3]:
Definition 2. Let (P1, . . . , Pk, V ) be a k-prover IP for a language L.Let view(P1, . . . , Pk, V, x)
denote the verifier’s incoming and outgoing messages with the provers, includ-
ing his coin tosses. We say that (P1, . . . , Pk, V ) is perfect zero-knowledge for
L if there exists an expected polynomial-time machine M such that for all V ′,
view(P1, . . . , Pk, V
′, x) and M(x) are identically distributed.
Let us call the above two definitions the standard MIP model. There have
also been augmentations of the model by giving the provers various non-local
resources, such as entanglement [18], or arbitrary no-signaling power [19].
The first work to point out the aforementioned blind spot in the standard
MIP model, although it was not worded explicitly, was [13]. In order to under-
stand their point, we need to understand the following two-prover protocol.
Protocol 3. ( BGKW-type commitment for bit b )
P1 and P2 pre-share a random n-bit string w.
1. V sends a random n-bit strings r to P2.
2. P2 replies with x← b× r ⊕ w.
3. P1 announces to V a string w
′.
4. V accepts iff (w′ ⊕ x) ∈ {0, r}.
6
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w′ := c× r ⊕ x //oo x (uniform)
Fig. 1. a PR-box
This is a two-prover commitment protocol. Steps 1 and 2 commit, while
steps 3 and 4 unveil. An intuitive proof of its binding condition is that, since
the provers cannot signal, and they both need to know r in order to unveil the
commitment in the way they want, therefore they cannot cheat. This intuition is
incomplete, as was pointed out in [13], because breaking the binding condition
does not require signaling. The following protocol, known as a PR-box, can be
used to break binding without signaling.
By having P1, P2 obtain w
′, x via the PR-box, P1 can unveil the commitment
the way it wishes, c. This fact will become extremely important in Sections 5
and 4.1.
The punchline of [13] is that the verifier itself can act as a PR-box for the
provers without violating their no-signaling assumption. Consider the following:
1. Any security proof of protocol 3 must show that it does not contain a PR-box
as a subroutine.
2. More generally, any security proof of a protocol must show that no subroutine
within itself can be commandeered by the provers to achieve a non-local
functionally (like the PR-box).
3. Composition of protocols, for instance between the committing and the open-
ing of commitments, must be done in such a way that provably does not
create a non-local box.
The solution proposed in [13] was that of verifier isolation. Informally, this
means that any message an “isolating” verifier sends to a set S of provers must
be computed solely from messages that are received from S. The end result
is that an isolating verifier can never accidentally implement a PR-box and, in
general, it will always enforce the locality of the provers. In a sense, we can think
of an isolating verifier as “local”. Our new model will make this more precise
and more general.
Furthermore, existing zero-knowledge MIPs such as [9] require that the ver-
ifier courier an authenticated message between the provers in order to obtain
soundness while ensuring zero-knowledge. The gist of it goes like this:
1. V asks P1 some questions.
2. V wants to check one of P1’s answers with P2 for consistency.
3. In order for zero-knowledge to hold, V must ask P2 a question it has already
asked P1.
4. P1 authenticates a question with a key that was committed at the beginning
of the protocol and sends it to V .
5. V sends the question and the authentication to P2, who proceeds only if
authentication succeeds.
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Steps 4 and 5 consists of V sending a message from P1 to P2. Proofs that this
act does not contaminate non-locally (such as simulating a PR-box) is not found
in any existing MIP. This needs to be proven, and the proof contained in [9] does
not address this issue. Moreover, the zero-knowledge protocol of [9] allows P1
to send an arbitrary message to P2 (via the authentication key). Therefore, one
cannot compose such a protocol in a nested fashion (as a subroutine call) since
the inner instance would violate the no-communication assumption of the outer
instance. For more details on the problems of the standard MIP model, see [28].
Existing simulators for zero-knowledge protocols such as those found in [9]
needs to know how to break commitments in order to simulate. The simulator
accomplishes this by acting as both provers, thereby receiving the secret string
r which was meant for one prover only. This standard model of zero-knowledge
gives the simulator unnecessary power, in a sense. We will discuss this further in
section 4.1.
4 Locality-Explicit MIP
The standard MIP model allows the verifier to non-locally contaminate the
provers. We neutralize this problem by defining a model with multiple veri-
fiers, each of which talks to a single prover; in turn, each prover talks to a single
verifier. There are no communication tapes between the verifiers, nor are there
between provers. There is a special verifier V0 which only reads the outputs of the
other verifiers; this is the verifier that will decide to accept or reject membership
to L. We call this model “locality-explicit” since the provers and verifiers are
explicitly local, and if any non-local resources (such as entanglement) are avail-
able to them, then it is explicitly specified via a supplementary entity named P̂
for the provers and V̂ for the verifiers.
This model is a generalization of the standard model because the special
setting where P̂ is empty and V̂ signals for the verifiers corresponds to the
standard MIP model.
Definition 3. An interactive Turning machine (ITM) is a Turing machine aug-
mented with the following tapes:
– k1 read-only incoming communication tapes.
– k2 write-only outgoing communication tapes.
– Private work, auxiliary-input, and random tapes.
An ITM A can signal to an ITM B if A’s write-only outgoing tape is B’s
read-only incoming tape.
Definition 4. Let (P̂ , P1, . . . , Pk, V̂ , V0, V1, . . . , Vk) be a tuple of ITMs, where
the P’s are computationally all-powerful and the V’s are polynomial-time. For
each i, there are two-way communication tapes between Vi and Pi, and that for
all j, there is a two-way communication tape between V̂ and Vj and also between
P̂ and Pj. In addition, for each `, there is a read-only tape going from V` to
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V0 (where V0 reads). Then, this is said to be a locality-explicit multi-prover
interactive proof.
We call P̂ and V̂ correlators and say that the provers and verifiers are P̂ -local
and V̂ -local respectively. We define the class of all MIPs with such correlators
MIPP̂
V̂
.
It is perhaps easier to understand our definition with the help of figure 2.
.	.	.
.	.	.
̂P ̂V
P1
P2
Pk
V1
V2
Vk
V0
Fig. 2. Locality-Explicit MIP
The solid lines represents two-way communication and the dashed arrows
represents one-way communication, with the arrow indicating the direction of
information flow.
We can define that an LE-MIP accepts a language L if the usual soundness
and completeness conditions hold:
Definition 5. An LE-MIP (V̂ , V0, V1, . . . , Vk, P̂ , P1, . . . , Pk) accepts a language
L if and only if
– (completeness) ∀x ∈ L,Pr[V0(x, t1, . . . , tk) = accept] > 2/3,
– (soundness) ∀x /∈ L,∀P ′1, . . . , P ′k,Pr[V0(x, t1, . . . , tk) = accept] < 1/3,
where ti is the read-only tape from Vi to V0 at the end of the interaction of
Vi with Pi (or P
′
i ) on input x.
Note that we do not quantify over P̂ (nor V̂ ), as we want to use them not as
(possibly malicious) participants to the protocol, but as a description of non-local
resources available to the provers and verifiers.
Definition 6. An LE-MIP is local if V̂ = P̂ = ∅ and all of the provers’
(resp. verifiers’) random tapes are initialized with the same uniformly random
string R (resp. verifiers with another, independent uniformly random string S)†.
† By ∅ we mean the empty correlator that provides everyone with nothing at all as
output.
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MIPs in the standard model (with local provers) are equivalent to LE-MIPs
where P̂ = ∅ and V̂ acts as a bulletin board. That is, a single verifier commu-
nicating with multiple provers is equivalent to multiple verifiers communicating
with provers and each other.
In standard MIPs, it is possible that the honest (single) verifier bridges the
provers non-locally. If a protocol does not desire this – and most existing MIPs
do not – it must be proven. With local LE-MIPs, the special verifier V0 decides
to accept or reject. This verifier cannot communicate with anyone else, avoiding
the aforementioned problem of contamination.
4.1 Zero-Knowledge LE-MIPs
Zero-knowledge is defined by simulations, the fundamental idea that if a tran-
script can be produced by an entity (simulator) with no more power than one
(verifier) interrogating all-powerful provers, then no knowledge is gained.
The simulator of single-prover IP and standard MIP are equal to the verifier
in computational power, but they do have “advantages” which allow them to
fake transcripts. For single-prover IPs, the simulator is allowed to rewind com-
putation; for standard MIPs, the simulator is given a (commitment-breaking)
secret. Those advantages are, of course, independent of knowledge.
LE-MIPs naturally induces a new advantage for the simulator: non-local cor-
relations. This is a very powerful advantage. Using the correct non-local corre-
lations, simulators do not need to rewind, do not need to pretend to be multiple
(isolated) provers, and do not need to know any commitment-breaking secrets.
In short, they do not need to signal. Multiple, no-signaling simulators can even
produce transcripts in “real-time” (example will follow) if the proper correlations
are used.
Definition 7. Let M = (M̂,M1, . . . ,Mk) be a tuple of polynomial-time ITMs.
Each machine has a random tape, and every random tape is initialized with the
same random bits. For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, there is a two-way communication tape between
M̂ and Mi. There are no communication tapes between any of the Mi’s. Then
this is called a tuple of locality-explicit simulators and M̂ is the locality class
of M, which will be abbreviated M̂ -local.
Definition 8 (White-box version).
Let PV = (P̂ , P1, . . . , Pk, V̂ , V0, V1, . . . , Vk) be an LE-MIP for language L.
If there exists a correlator Ŝ such that for all verifiers (V ′0 , V
′
1 , . . . , V
′
k), there
exists (S1, . . . , Sk) for all correlator V̂
′, such that for all x ∈ L the transcripts
of conversations
(P̂ , P1, . . . , Pk, V̂
′, V ′0 , V
′
1 , . . . , V
′
k)(x)
and those generated by
(Ŝ ∪ V̂ ′, V ′0 , S1, . . . , Sk)(x)
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are identically distributed, where (Ŝ, S1, . . . , Sk) is a tuple of locality-explicit sim-
ulators, then we say that PV is a Ŝ-local perfect zero-knowledge LE-MIP for
L.
We will denote the set of all ZK LE-MIPs where the provers, verifiers, and
simulators are P̂ -local, V̂ -local, and Ŝ-local by
ZKŜMIPP̂
V̂
.
Let S,P,V be sets of correlators. We will denote, by convention,
ZKSMIPPV
as the set of all ZK LE-MIPs where each correlator comes from each of the
respective sets.
Definition 9 (Black-box version).
Let PV = (P̂ , P1, . . . , Pk, V̂ , V0, V1, . . . , Vk) be an LE-MIP for language L.
If there exists a tuple of locality-explicit simulators (Ŝ, S1, . . . , Sk), such that
for all verifiers (V̂ ′, V ′0 , V
′
1 , . . . , V
′
k), such that for all x ∈ L the transcripts of
conversations
(P̂ , P1, . . . , Pk, V̂
′, V ′0 , V
′
1 , . . . , V
′
k)(x)
and those generated by
(Ŝ, V ′0 , S1(V
′
1), . . . , Sk(V
′
k))(x)
(where the V ′i still have access to V̂
′) are identically distributed, then we say that
PV is a Ŝ-local perfect (black-box) zero-knowledge LE-MIP for L.
We will denote the set of all BBZK LE-MIPs where the provers, verifiers,
and simulators are P̂ -local, V̂ -local, and Ŝ-local by
ZKŜBBMIP
P̂
V̂
.
Let S,P,V be sets of correlators. We will denote, by convention,
ZKSBBMIP
P
V
as the set of all BBZK LE-MIPs where each correlator comes from each of the
respective sets.
Our motivations for the above definitions are twofold.
First, a simulator (or simulators) should not have more power than necessary.
If two local simulators can output for two local verifiers, then it is not necessary
to have a single simulator (equivalent to two signaling simulators) do the job.
Allowing simulators to signal (equivalently, having a single simulator) in the
multi-prover setting is analogous to allowing unbounded running-time simulation
in single-prover zero-knowledge. In general, finding the minimal Ŝ that will allow
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simulation establishes how little extra is needed to obtain the zero-knowledge
property.
Second, the non-locality of simulators is a characterization of the resilience of
zero-knowledge. A protocol with local simulators which can withstand arbitrary
(malicious) verifiers is more resilient than one in which signaling simulators are
needed.
This may be of practical interest, if transcripts are timestamped. For ex-
ample, under the relativistic assumption that one may not signal faster-than-
light, one may be able to distinguish two spatially separated simulators from
two spatially separated verifiers, if the simulators need to signal (transmit a
commitment-breaking secret) in order to generate a transcript. On the other
hand, if two entangled simulators are sufficient to produce the transcript, then
they are indistinguishable from real verifiers and provers. Our protocol 7 can be
modified as to let entangled simulators do their work, without needing PR-boxes
or signaling. Details in section 5.
4.2 The Power of LE-MIPs
Local LE-MIPs form a subclass of standard MIPs. They are, by design, more re-
stricted in what you can make the verifier do. An immediate question is whether
this is too restrictive. Perhaps, in all interesting cases, it is necessary for a sin-
gle verifier to go back-and-fourth between provers, using previous discussions to
generate new questions.
The answer is that, of all the literature we have surveyed, almost all protocols
can be re-written in a local-verifier manner without any loss of functionality. We
explicitly demonstrate this for the multi-prover protocol for oracle-3-SAT in
[8]. The protocol details can be found in the appendix. For the purpose of our
discussion, we only need to look at the general form of the protocol:
Protocol 4. ( BFL Classic, Single-Verifier )
1. V asks P1 some questions non-adaptively.
2. V chooses a question Q from the pool of questions which were asked
to P1.
3. V asks Q to P2.
4. V accepts if the interaction with P1 was successful, and the answer
from P2 is consistent with those of P1.
The crucial observation is that V does not adaptively ask questions to P1.
Therefore, the questions asked on that entire side of the conversation can be
selected in advance, and thus they can be shared in advance with a second
verifier. We can therefore naturally rewrite the BFL classic protocol as a local
LE-MIP in the following way. The reader can check the details in the appendix,
and in section 3 of [8].
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Protocol 5. ( BFL as an LE-MIP )
1. V1 prepares the questions which it will ask P1.
2. V1 chooses a question Q from the above list and shares it with V2.
3. LE-MIP begins. All parties are local as per definitions.
4. V1 asks the questions to P1.
5. V2 asks Q to P2.
6. V0, reading the responses, decides to accept or reject, based on the
same criteria as in protocol 4.
The BFL protocol is for oracle-3-SAT, which is NEXP-complete. Rewrit-
ten as a local LE-MIP, it circumvents all non-locality issues we have mentioned.
Thus, we can conclusively say that “MIP∅∅ = MIP = NEXP”; no transforma-
tion to single-round MIP necessary, and no need to invoke the general theory of
PCPs.
5 ZKPRMIP∅∅ = NEXP
The question which follows naturally is whether there exists a zero-knowledge,
local LE-MIP for NEXP. The existing technique for achieving zero-knowledge
in MIP [3,9] requires the (single) verifier to courier an authenticated message
between provers. This is not possible with local-verifier LE-MIPs. We show that
there is a way around that constraint.
By adapting the protocol from [8], we will exhibit a protocol with the follow-
ing properties:
1. The provers and verifiers are local: V̂ = P̂ = ∅.
2. The simulators need only access to instances of PR-boxes to work. That is,
M̂ simply computes indexed instances of PR-boxes. We will abbreviate this
as “PR-local.”
We may succinctly summarize the above as ZKPRMIP∅∅ = NEXP, where
PR denotes a correlator which simply computes PR-boxes for the simulators.
The generic way of turning an interactive proof into a zero-knowledge one
is by running it in committed form [3,9]. With this technique, provers commit
their answers instead of directly responding, and use cryptographic techniques
to convince the verifier that the answers are correct.
As shown in section 4.2, the BFL protocol can be turned into a local LE-
MIP. If we try to turn it into a zero-knowledge LE-MIP by having the provers
commit their answers (for example using protocol 3 as commitment), we run into
a problem. In order to achieve zero-knowledge, the provers must ensure that the
question P2 receives from V2 is one of the questions which V1 has asked P1.
On the other hand, since the provers and verifiers are local, the provers cannot
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communicate, nor can they ask the verifiers to courier authenticated messages
between them.
Our solution essentially asks the provers to (strongly-universal-2) hash the
selected committed answer with a key that is based on the verifier’s question.
We force V2 to behave honestly (to ask a question that V1 has asked) by making
bad questions meaningless. If the verifiers ask the provers the same question,
they will receive the same hash of the same answer. Otherwise, they will receive
two unrelated random hash values.
We need the PR commitment (protocol 6), which is secure in the local setting
as previously proved in [23,13,24].
5.1 The Protocols
The following is a PR-type commitment that is perfectly concealing and sta-
tistically binding. In general, we use the commitment-box notation “ b ” as the
name of a commitment to bit b in the next two protocols.
Protocol 6. A statistically binding, perfectly concealing commitment pro-
tocol to bit b.
All parties agree on a security parameter 1k.
P1 and P2 partition their private random tape into two k-bit strings
w1, w2.
Pre-computation phase:
– V1 samples two k-bit strings z1, z2 independently and uniformly, and
provides them to V2.
– V1 sends z1 to P1 and V2 sends z2 to P2.
Commit phase:
– P1 commits b to V1 as b = (b × z1) ⊕ w1, where b × z1 is a multi-
plication in F2n .
– P2 sends V2: d = (w1 × z2)⊕ w2.
Unveiling phase:
– P1 sends w1, w2 to V1.
– V1 computes b = 1 if b ⊕ w1 = z1, or b = 0 if b = w1.
– V0 rejects if b ⊕w1 is anything but z1 or 0, or if d⊕w2 6= w1 × z2
and accepts b otherwise.
Below is the zero-knowledge, local LE-MIP for oracle-3-SAT (Protocol 7).
The basis of protocol 7 is the localized BFL protocol we presented in section
4.2 (details in the appendix). A note on notation: for a circuit f , we will de-
note f
(
x
)
as the gate-by-gate committed circuit evaluated with x as the input.
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We also use statements such as “P1 proves to V1 that Ω1 was computed cor-
rectly”. The reader is expected familiarity with zero-knowledge computations on
committed circuits as put forward by [29,30,5,9].
Protocol 7. A local zero-knowledge LE-MIP for oracle-3-SAT
Let x = (B, r, s), an instance of oracle-3-SAT, be the common input, let
k = |x| = r + 3s + 3, and let Λ be the verifier’s program in protocol 11
(see appendix).
1. Pre-computation:
(a) V1 samples two k-bit strings z1, z2 independently and uniformly,
and provides them to V2.
(b) V1 selects k+3 random bit strings R1, ..., Rk+3 (size specified im-
plicitly by Λ) and evaluates the circuit of Λ using the Ri as ran-
domness, resulting in questions Q1, ..., Qk+3, and provides them
to V2
(c) V1 randomly chooses i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k + 3, the index of an oracle
query that will be made to both P1 and P2. V1 provides i to V2.
(d) V1 sends z1 to P1 and V2 sends z2 to P2 for future commitments.
(e) All parties agree on a family of strongly-universal-2 hash func-
tions {Hi} indexed by k-bit keys.
(f) P1 and P2 agree on a k-bit key γ, an index to the above family.
(g) P1 commits γ to V1.
2. Sumcheck with oracle:
– Let f be the arithmetization obtained in protocol 10, let z be a
string from Ir andQk+1, Qk+2, Qk+3 be strings of I
s as generated
in protocol 11. V1 and P1 execute protocol 10 in committed form.
At the end of this phase, P1 shows that the committed final value
is equal to
f
(
z,Qk+1, Qk+2, Qk+3, A(Qk+1) , A(Qk+2) , A(Qk+3)
)
,
an evaluation in committed form of f using the committed val-
ues that were used during the protocol’s loop. If this fails, V1
instructs V0 to reject.
3. Multilinearity test:
(a) For 1 ≤ i ≤ k:
i. V1 sends Qi to P1,
ii. P1 commits his answer as A(Qi) .
(b) P1 and V1 evaluate a circuit description of Λ in committed form
with inputs A(Q1) , . . . , A(Qk) to verify proper linearity among
them. P1 unveils the circuit’s committed output. If it rejects, V1
instructs V0 to reject.
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4. Consistency test:
(a) V1 sends i to P1.
(b) P1 computes Ω1 = A(Qi) ⊕H γ (Qi) and sends Ω1 to V1.
(c) P1 proves to V1 that Ω1 was computed correctly, from the ex-
isting commitments.
(d) P1 unveils Ω1 for V1, who gets Ω1.
(e) V2 sends Qi to P2 (recall that this was pre-agreed in step 1.(c))
(f) P2 responds to V2 with Ω2 = A(Qi)⊕Hγ(Qi).
(g) V0 accepts if and only if all of the following conditions are met:
– Ω1 = Ω2
– All commitments which have been unveiled are valid.
– V1 did not reject in the two previous cases
5.2 Proofs of Security
Locality
Since the protocol is written as an LE-MIP in which P̂ = V̂ = ∅, the protocol
is local by definition 6.
Completeness
Completeness follows from the completeness of the underlying protocol [8],
and the fact that the commitment protocol (protocol 6) is well-defined for honest
provers (who will never send a commitment that they cannot unveil).
Soundness
Without loss of generality, we may assume that the soundness error in the
BFL protocol to be 1/3, through sequential amplification. The probability that
our commitment scheme (protocol 6) fails binding is exponentially small in k.
Local probabilistic provers are equivalent to local deterministic provers. This is
because the success probability α of randomized provers of breaking soundness
is an average over the randomized provers’ random tapes. Each instance of a
random tape represents a deterministic strategy. Therefore there is a determin-
istic strategy which succeeds with probability at least α, and hence we only need
to consider local deterministic provers.
Since P1 is deterministic, we may unambiguously consider what happens if
we were to “rewind” the prover machine. Suppose that at some point P1 unveils
a particular commitment c to 0. We rewind P1 and let V1 make different choices
before that point. Suppose that, with these alternate choices, P1 then unveils c to
1 (an attempt to break binding). Because of locality, P1’s behavior is independent
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of what P2 receives (namely z2). Therefore, there is only one such z2 which V0
will ultimately accept as a valid unveiling of c in both ways (recall that our
commitment is statistically binding).
Therefore, in the worst case, for every commitment there exists a sequence of
interactions between V1 and P1 such that P1 will attempt to break the binding
of that commitment. Each such commitment-breaking corresponds to at most
one string z2 that will actually work.
Let us denote the set of such binding-breaking strings by B. If z2 /∈ B, then
the provers will not break binding, and the soundness error is reduced to that of
the underlying protocol (at most 1/3). On the other hand, since |B| < poly(k),
the probability that z2 ∈ B is at most poly(k)/2k.
Therefore, the soundness error of our protocol is at most
Pr[z2 /∈ B and underlying protocol accepts] + Pr[z2 ∈ B] ≤ 1
3
+
poly(k)
2k
.
Zero-Knowledge The simulation will be divided in two parts. In the first part,
the simulator produces a transcript of the pre-computation, multilinearity test
and sumcheck with oracle parts, which involves only interactions with V1. In the
second part, the simulator will fake a valid consistency test.
Protocol 8. ( Perfectly Indistinguishable, PR-Local Simulator for Pro-
tocol 7, Part 1)
The setup:
– Let (Ŝ, S1, S2) be a set of locality-explicit simulators.
– S1 and S2 can send Ŝ an index along with a bit.
– Ŝ completes the indexed PR box (protocol 3) for both simulators.
The simulation strategy:
1. The simulators agree on unique indices for every commitment used
in the protocol.
2. S1 interacts with V1 the way P1 would. Whenever P1 should commit,
S1 commits to random bits, just like the single-simulator from Sec. 5.
3. For each commitment, V2 sends S2 a string s. S2 sends to Ŝ the index
of the commitment and s.
4. Ŝ runs the PR box (protocol 3) and replies with V2’s half of the
output.
5. Whenever S1 needs to unveil a commitment, it can be unveiled in
the way S1 desires by sending the corresponding index and bit to Ŝ.
6. Ŝ completes the corresponding PR box which outputs t. Ŝ sends t
to S1.
7. S1 sends t to V1.
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The second part (the consistency test) can be done by having the simulators
ignore the question.
Protocol 9. ( Perfectly Indistinguishable, PR-Local Simulator for Pro-
tocol 7, Part 2)
1. V1 sends i to S1.
2. S1 computes Ω1 = H γ (Qi).
3. Using Ŝ to break binding, S1 convinces V1 that Ω1 is actually
A(Qi) ⊕H γ (Qi).
4. S1 unveils Ω1 for V1, who gets Ω1 = Hγ(Qi).
5. V2 sends Q
′
i to S2.
6. S2 responds with Ω2 = Hγ(Q
′
i).
By the properties of the strongly-universal-2 hash H, if Qi = Q
′
i then
Ω1 = Ω2. Otherwise Ω1 6= Ω2 with probability exponentially close to one. This
produces the result as desired. The simulators then feed the transcripts to V0,
and terminates simulation.
5.3 Entangled Simulators
The binding condition of commitment used above (protocol 6) can be broken
given PR-boxes. However, if the verifier were willing to tolerate approximately
15% of errors in the provers’ unveiling string (z1 or 0), then it is possible to break
binding with shared entanglement [31] while maintaining soundness against local
provers. Using this weakened version of commitment in place of protocol 6 yields
a ZK
poly
|LOC〉MIP∅∅ protocol for a NEXP-complete language (ZK
poly
|LOC〉 denotes
shared entanglement for the simulator; consult Appendix B for more notations).
We leave the details of this modification to the reader.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
MIP is cryptographic. NEXP is complexity theoretic. Although there exists a
non-adaptive MIP which accepts NEXP (resolving the complexity of MIP and
avoiding contamination), there seems to be a bit of an unexplored dimension on
the zero-knowledge (cryptographic) side of things. LE-MIPs accomplishes two
things: it makes explicit that non-adaptive verifiers are not necessary to avoid
contamination, and it induces the question of non-locality with respect to zero-
knowledge. We close with four open questions.
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First, although the provers and verifiers of protocol 7 are local, the simulators
are not – they use PR-boxes. We do not know whether it is possible to simulate
protocol 7 with local simulators. In fact, we conjecture that there does not exist
a ZK∅MIP∅∅ protocol for any NEXP-complete language.
Second, as we have sketched out in section 5.3, by weakening the commitment
scheme used, we get ZK
poly
|LOC〉MIP∅∅ = NEXP. What is a minimal Ŝ such that
ZKŜMIP∅∅ = NEXP?
Third, as of the time of this writing, it is an open question whether NEXP (
MIP∗ [18]. Under the locality-explicit setup, we ask a slightly more general ques-
tion: does there exist a correlator P̂ and a corresponding LE-MIP which accepts
a language /∈ NEXP? We remind the reader that characterizing the complexity
classes of MIPs where the provers have non-local resources are generally open
questions.
Finally, although the verifier’s contamination is undesirable (in the standard
MIP model), is it possible to turn it into a resource? For example, given local
provers, let the verifier provide them with some non-local resources, such PR-
boxes or entanglement that can be simulated in polynomial-time. This can be
seen as “enforceable honest non-local resources.” Malicious provers would not
be able to use these resources at will. Perhaps this concept would be useful in
the design of multi-prover protocols.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank G. Brassard, A. Chailloux, S. Fehr, J. Kilian, S. Laplante,
J. Li, A. Leverrier, A. Massenet, S. Ranellucci, L. Salvail, C. Schaffner, and
T. Vidick for various discussions about earlier versions of this work. We would
also like to thank Jeremy Clark for his insightful comments. Finally, we are
grateful to Raphael Phan and Moti Yung for inviting us to publish a lead-up
paper to this work as an Insight Paper at MyCrypt 2016.
References
1. S. Goldwasser, S. Micali, and C. Rackoff, “The knowledge complexity of interactive
proof-systems,” SIAM. J. Computing, vol. 18, pp. 186–208, Feb. 1989.
2. L. Babai, “Trading group theory for randomness,” in Proceedings of the Seventeenth
Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 421–429, May 1985.
3. M. Ben-Or, S. Goldwasser, J. Kilian, and A. Wigderson, “Multi-prover interactive
proofs: How to remove intractability assumptions,” in Proceedings of the Twentieth
Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC ’88, (New York, NY,
USA), pp. 113–131, ACM, 1988.
4. A. Shamir, “IP = PSPACE,” J. ACM, vol. 39, pp. 869–877, Oct. 1992.
5. R. Impagliazzo and M. Yung, “Direct minimum-knowledge computations,” in Ad-
vances in Cryptology: Proceedings of Crypto ’87 (C. Pomerance, ed.), vol. 293,
pp. 40–51, Springer-Verlag, 1988.
19
6. M. Ben-Or, O. Goldreich, S. Goldwasser, J. H˚astad, J. Kilian, S. Micali, and
P. Rogaway, “Everything provable is provable in zero-knowledge,” in Proceedings
of the 8th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology,
CRYPTO ’88, (London, UK, UK), pp. 37–56, Springer-Verlag, 1990.
7. L. Fortnow, J. Rompel, and M. Sipser, “On the power of multi-prover interactive
protocols,” Theor. Comput. Sci., vol. 134, pp. 545–557, Nov. 1994.
8. L. Babai, L. Fortnow, and C. Lund, “Non-deterministic exponential time has two-
prover interactive protocols,” Comput. Complex., vol. 2, pp. 374–374, Dec. 1992.
9. J. Kilian, Uses of randomness in algorithms and protocols. MIT Press, 1990.
10. U. Feige and J. Kilian, “Two prover protocols: low error at affordable rates,” in Pro-
ceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing,
23-25 May 1994, Montre´al, Que´bec, Canada (F. T. Leighton and M. T. Goodrich,
eds.), pp. 172–183, ACM, 1994.
11. C. Dwork, U. Feige, J. Kilian, M. Naor, and S. Safra, “Low communication 2-prover
zero-knowledge proofs for NP,” in Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO ’92, 12th
Annual International Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, California, USA, Au-
gust 16-20, 1992, Proceedings (E. F. Brickell, ed.), vol. 740 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pp. 215–227, Springer, 1992.
12. U. Feige and J. Kilian, “Two-prover protocols - low error at affordable rates,”
SIAM J. Comput., vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 324–346, 2000.
13. C. Cre´peau, L. Salvail, J.-R. Simard, and A. Tapp, “Two provers in isolation,”
in Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2011: 17th International Conference
on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Seoul,
South Korea, December 4-8, 2011. Proceedings, (Berlin, Heidelberg), pp. 407–430,
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011.
14. J. Kilian, “Personal e-mail communication,” July 2018.
15. D. Lapidot and A. Shamir, “Fully parallelized multi prover protocols for nexp-time
(extended abstract),” in 32nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer
Science, San Juan, Puerto Rico, 1-4 October 1991, pp. 13–18, IEEE Computer
Society, 1991.
16. U. Feige and L. Lova´sz, “Two-prover one-round proof systems: Their power and
their problems (extended abstract),” in Proceedings of the Twenty-fourth Annual
ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC ’92, (New York, NY, USA),
pp. 733–744, ACM, 1992.
17. D. Lapidot and A. Shamir, “Fully parallelized multi-prover protocols for nexp-
time,” J. Comput. Syst. Sci., vol. 54, no. 2, pp. 215–220, 1997.
18. T. Ito and T. Vidick, “A multi-prover interactive proof for nexp sound against
entangled provers,” in Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE 53rd Annual Symposium on
Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS ’12, (Washington, DC, USA), pp. 243–
252, IEEE Computer Society, 2012.
19. Y. T. Kalai, R. Raz, and R. D. Rothblum, “How to delegate computations: The
power of no-signaling proofs,” in Proceedings of the Forty-sixth Annual ACM Sym-
posium on Theory of Computing, STOC ’14, (New York, NY, USA), pp. 485–494,
ACM, 2014.
20. A. Chiesa, M. A. Forbes, T. Gur, and N. Spooner, “Spatial isolation implies zero
knowledge even in a quantum world,” Electronic Colloquium on Computational
Complexity (ECCC), vol. 25, p. 44, 2018.
21. M. Bellare, U. Feige, and J. Kilian, “On the role of shared randomness in two prover
proof systems,” in Third Israel Symposium on Theory of Computing and Systems,
ISTCS 1995, Tel Aviv, Israel, January 4-6, 1995, Proceedings, pp. 199–208, IEEE
Computer Society, 1995.
20
22. J. Kilian, “Strong separation models of multi prover interactive proofs,” in DI-
MACS Workshop on Cryptography, 1990.
23. A. Kent, “Unconditionally secure bit commitment,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 83,
pp. 1447–1450, Aug 1999.
24. T. Lunghi, J. Kaniewski, F. Bussie`res, R. Houlmann, M. Tomamichel, S. Wehner,
and H. Zbinden, “Practical relativistic bit commitment,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 115,
p. 030502, Jul 2015.
25. E. Adlam and A. Kent, “Deterministic relativistic quantum bit commitment,”
CoRR, vol. abs/1504.00943, 2015.
26. A. Chailloux and A. Leverrier, “Relativistic (or 2-prover 1-round) zero-knowledge
protocol for NP secure against quantum adversaries,” in Advances in Cryptology
– EUROCRYPT 2017: 36th Annual International Conference on the Theory and
Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Paris, France, April 30 – May 4, 2017,
Proceedings, Part III, pp. 369–396, Springer International Publishing, 2017.
27. J. S. Bell, “On the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox,” Physics, vol. 1, pp. 195–200,
1964.
28. C. Cre´peau and N. Yang, “Multi-prover interactive proofs: Unsound foundations,”
in Paradigms in Cryptology – Mycrypt 2016. Malicious and Exploratory Cryptol-
ogy: Second International Conference, Mycrypt 2016, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia,
December 1-2, 2016, Revised Selected Papers, pp. 485–493, Springer International
Publishing, 2017.
29. G. Brassard and C. Cre´peau, “Zero-knowledge simulation of boolean circuits (ex-
tended abstract),” in Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings of Crypto ’86 (A. M.
Odlyzko, ed.), vol. 263, pp. 223–233, Springer-Verlag, 1987.
30. G. Brassard and C. Cre´peau, “Non-transitive transfer of confidence: A perfect zero-
knowledge interactive protocol for SAT and beyond,” in 27th Symp. of Found. of
Computer Sci., pp. 188–195, IEEE, 1986.
31. G. Brassard, A. Broadbent, and A. Tapp, “Multi-party pseudo-telepathy,” in Al-
gorithms and Data Structures (F. Dehne, J.-R. Sack, and M. Smid, eds.), (Berlin,
Heidelberg), pp. 1–11, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2003.
32. A. Ac´ın, T. Fritz, A. Leverrier, and A. B. Sainz, “A combinatorial approach to
nonlocality and contextuality,” Communications in Mathematical Physics, vol. 334,
pp. 533–628, Mar 2015.
33. H. Barnum, C. A. Fuchs, J. M. Renes, and A. Wilce, “Influence-free states on
compound quantum systems,” CoRR, vol. quant-ph/0507108v1, 2005.
34. J. Barrett, N. Linden, S. Massar, S. Pironio, S. Popescu, and D. Roberts, “Nonlocal
correlations as an information-theoretic resource,” Phys. Rev. A, vol. 71, p. 022101,
Feb 2005.
35. M. Forster and S. Wolf, “Bipartite units of nonlocality,” Phys. Rev. A, vol. 84,
p. 042112, Oct 2011.
36. T. Ito, H. Kobayashi, D. Preda, X. Sun, and A. C. Yao, “Generalized tsirelson
inequalities, commuting-operator provers, and multi-prover interactive proof sys-
tems,” in Proceedings of the 23rd Annual IEEE Conference on Computational Com-
plexity, CCC 2008, 23-26 June 2008, College Park, Maryland, USA, pp. 187–198,
IEEE Computer Society, 2008.
21
A Babai, Fortnow and Lund’s MIP for Languages in
NEXP
This section describes a variant of the multi-prover protocol for oracle-3-SAT
found in [8]. We refer to this as the BFL protocol, or BFL classic.
Definition 10. Let r, s > 0 be integers. Let z, b1, b2, b3 be strings of variables,
where |z| = r and |bi| = s. Let B(z, b1, b2, b3, t1, t2, t3) be a Boolean formula in
r + 3s + 3 variables. A Boolean function A : {0, 1}s → {0, 1} is a 3-satisfying
oracle for B if
B(z, b1, b2, b3, A(b1), A(b2), A(b3)) = 1
for every string z, b1, b2, b3.
B is oracle-3-satisfiable if such a function A exists.
The Oracle-3-SAT problem (B, r, s) asks whether a Boolean formula B is
oracle-3-satisfiable, where r and s denote the lengths of z and bi, as above.
Lemma 1. Oracle-3-SAT is NEXP-complete.
Definition 11. Let F be an arbitrary field. Let φ : {0, 1}m → {0, 1} be a
Boolean function. An arithmetization of φ is a polynomial f(x1, . . . , xm) ∈
F[X1, . . . , Xm] such that for all z ∈ {0, 1}m, φ(z) = 0 ⇔ f(z) = 0. A spe-
cific one is given in [8], proposition 3.1 .
Equivalently, the φ(z) = 0⇔ f(z) = 0 condition can be replaced with φ(z) =
1⇔ f(z) = 0.
Protocol 10. ( Sumcheck Protocol )
Let φ(x1, . . . , xm) be the 3-CNF formula which the prover P is trying to
show to be a tautology to a verifier V . Let F be a field of sufficient size
(of order at least (3c+ 1)m will suffice where c is the number of clauses
of φ).
1. V takes φ and computes its arithmetization f according to [8] Propo-
sition 3.1 and sends it to P .
2. V and P agree on a set I ⊂ F of size at least 2dm where d is the
degree of f .
3. V assigns b0 = 0, which is supposed to be equal to the sum
1∑
x1=0
. . .
1∑
xm=0
f(x1, . . . , xm)
2 = 0
4. i← 1.
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5. P sends the coefficients of the univariate polynomial in x,
gi(x) = h(r1, . . . , ri−1, x) =
1∑
xi+1=0
. . .
1∑
xm=0
f(r1, . . . , ri−1, x, xi+1, . . . , xm)2
6. V checks whether bi−1 = gi(0) + gi(1). If not, abort.
7. V chooses a random ri ∈ I, computes bi = gi(ri) and sends ri to P .
8. If i ≤ m then i← i+ 1 and go to step 4.
9. V checks whether bm = f(r1, . . . , rm)
2.
Protocol 11. ( Babai, Fortnow and Lund’s MIP for Oracle-3-SAT )
Given (B, r, s) as common input.
1. (sumcheck with oracle) V and P1 execute protocol 10. Let (Qk+1, Qk+2, Qk+3) =
(rr+1...rr+s, rr+s+1...rr+2s, rr+2s+1...rr+3s) ∈ (Is)3 be V ’s questions
during this phase.
2. (multilinearity test) V asks P1 to simulate an oracle storing the
function A. V queries P1 with random, linearly related values in
Is. If any response does not satisfy linearity, abort protocol. Let
Q1, . . . , Qk ∈ Is be V ’s questions during this phase.
3. (non-adaptiveness test) V chooses uniformly at random an i such
that 1 ≤ i ≤ k+3 and asks Qi to P2. If P2’s answer differs from that
of P1, reject. Otherwise accept.
B Non-Locality – an introduction
In this section we solely focus on the two-party single-round games and strategies
that are sufficient to discuss and analyze most of the MIPs. Definitions and proofs
for complete generalizations to multi-party multi-round games and strategies will
appear in a forthcoming paper with co-author Adel Magra.
Games: Let V be a predicate on A×B ×X × Y (for some finite sets A,B,X,
and Y ) and let pi be a probability distribution on A×B. Then V and pi define a
(single-round) game G as follows: A pair of questions (a, b) is randomly chosen
according to distribution pi, and a ∈ A is sent to Alice and b ∈ B is sent to Bob.
Alice must respond with an answer x ∈ X and Bob with an answer y ∈ Y . Alice
and Bob win if V evaluates to 1 on (a, b, x, y) and lose otherwise.
Strategies: Two-Party Channels A strategy for Alice and Bob is simply a
probability distribution P(x,y|a,b) describing exactly how they will answer (x, y)
on every pair of questions (a, b). We now breakdown the set of all possible strate-
gies for Alice and Bob according to their non-locality.
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Deterministic and Local Strategies: A strategy P(x,y|a,b) is deterministic if
there exists functions fA : A→ X, fB : B → Y such that
P(x,y|a,b) =
{
1 if x = fA(a) and y = fB(b)
0 otherwise
.
A deterministic strategy corresponds to the situation where Alice and Bob agree
on their individual actions before any knowledge of the values a, b is provided to
them. In this case they use only their own input to determine their individual
output.
A strategy P(x,y|a,b) is local if there exists a finite set R and functions fA :
A×R→ X, fB : B ×R→ Y such that
P(x,y|a,b) =
|{r ∈ R : x = fA(a, r) and y = fB(b, r)|
|R| .
A local strategy corresponds to the situation where Alice and Bob agree on a
deterministic strategy selected uniformly among |R| such possibilities. The choice
r of Alice and Bob’s strategy, and the choice of inputs (a, b) provided to Alice
and Bob are generally agreed to be statistically independent random variables.
B.1 Local Reducibility
We now turn to the notion of locally reducing a strategy to another, that is
how Alice and Bob limited to local strategies but equipped with a particular
(not necessarily local) strategy U ′ are able to achieve another particular (not
necessarily local) strategy U . For this purpose we introduce a notion of distance
between strategies in order to analyze strategies that are approaching each other
asymptotically.
Distances between Strategies: Several distances could be selected here as
long as their meaning as it approaches zero are the same. In the definitions
below, U,U ′ are strategies and U ′ is a finite set of strategies.
Definition 12. |U,U ′| =
∑
a,b,x,y
|PU (x, y|a, b)− PU ′(x, y|a, b)|
Definition 13. |U,U ′| = min
U ′∈U ′
|U,U ′|
Local extensions of Strategies: For natural integer n, we define the set
LOCn(U) of strategies that are local extensions (of order n) of U to be all the
strategies Alice and Bob can achieve using local strategies where strategy U may
be used up to n times as sub-routine calls‡. If we restrict all the functions used
to be polynomial-time computable we analogously define LOC
poly
n(U).
‡ Done by selecting functions f0A : A × R → A, f1A : A × X × R → A, ..., fn−1A :
A × Xn−1 × R → A, fnA : A × Xn × R → X to determine the input of each
sub-routine from input a and previous outputs.
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Definition 14. U ′ Locally (poly-)Reduces to U (U ′ ≤LOC
(poly)
U) iff lim
n→∞|U
′, LOC
(poly)
n(U)| =
0.
Definition 15. U ′ is Locally (poly-)Equivalent to U (U ′ =LOC
(poly)
U) iff U ′ ≤LOC
(poly)
U ≤LOC
(poly)
U ′.
Non-Adaptive extensions of Strategies: For natural integer n, we define
the set NADn(U) of strategies that are Non-Adaptive extensions (of order n)
of U to be all the strategies Alice and Bob can achieve using Non-Adaptive
strategies where strategy U may be used up to n times as sub-routine calls§. If
we restrict the functions used to be poly-time computable we get NAD
poly
n(U).
Definition 16. U ′ Non-Adaptively (poly-)Reduces to U (U ′ ≤NAD
(poly)
U) iff lim
n→∞|U
′,NAD
(poly)
n(U)| =
0.
Definition 17. U ′ is Non-Adaptively (poly-)Equivalent to U (U ′ =NAD
(poly)
U) iff
U ′ ≤NAD
(poly)
U ≤NAD
(poly)
U ′.
In general, Non-Adaptive reducibility is a weaker notion than local reducibil-
ity. However, for certain distributions U it may result that {D|D ≤LOC
(poly)
U} =
{D|D ≤NAD
(poly)
U} as follows.
B.2 Locality
We now define the lowest of the non-locality classes LOC. We could define it
directly from the notion of local strategies as defined above, but for analogy with
the other classes we later define, LOC is defined as all those strategies locally
reducible to a complete strategy we call ID (see Fig. 3). Of course, any strategy
is complete for this class.
a //
ID
boo
a //oo b
Fig. 3. an ID-box
Definition 18. LOC = {U |U ≤LOC ID} and LOC
poly
= {U |U ≤LOC
poly
ID}
§ Done by selecting functions f0A : A×R→ A, f1A : A×R→ A, ..., fn−1A : A×R→ A,
fnA : A×Xn×R→ X to determine the input of each sub-routine from input a only.
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Note: LOC is the class of strategies that John Bell [27] considered as classical
hidden-variable theories that he compared to entanglement. It is also the class
of strategies that BenOr, Goldwasser, Kilian and Wigderson [3] chose to define
classical Provers in Multi-Provers Interactive Proof Systems. LOC is also those
strategies Non-Adaptively reducible to ID
Definition 19. Alternatively, LOC = {U |U ≤NAD ID} and LOC
poly
= {U |U ≤NAD
poly
ID}
Alternatively, we can also define LOC from an empty box as used in the core
of this paper
a //
∅
boo
x //oo y
Fig. 4. an ∅-box where x ∈ X and y ∈ Y are uniform and independent of everything
else
Definition 20. Alternatively, LOC = {U |U ≤NAD ∅} = {U |U ≤LOC ∅}
B.3 One-Way Signalling
We now turn to One-Way Signalling which allows communication from one side
to the other. We name the directions arbitrarily Left and Right. We define R-SIG
(resp. L-SIG) as all those strategies locally reducible to a complete strategy we
call R-SIG (see Fig. 5) (resp. L-SIG (see Fig. 6)). These classes are useful to
define what it means for a strategy to signal as well as the notion of No-Signalling
strategies.
a //
R-SIG
boo
a //oo a
Fig. 5. an R-SIG-box
Definition 21. R-SIG = {U |U ≤LOC R-SIG} and R-SIG
poly
= {U |U ≤LOC
poly
R-SIG}
Definition 22. We say that U Right Signals (is R-SIG-verbose¶) iff R-SIG ≤LOC
U .
¶ We define the notion of L-verbose in analogy to NP-hard: it means “as verbose as any
distribution in non-locality class L”. In consequence, a distribution U is L-complete
if U ∈ L and U is L-verbose.
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a //
L-SIG
boo
b //oo b
Fig. 6. an L-SIG-box
Definition 23. L-SIG = {U |U ≤LOC L-SIG} and L-SIG
poly
= {U |U ≤LOC
poly
L-SIG}
Definition 24. We say that U Left Signals (is L-SIG-verbose) iff L-SIG ≤LOC
U .
Definition 25. We say that U Signals iff U Right Signals or Left Signals.
We prove a first result that is intuitively obvious. We show that the complete
strategy R-SIG cannot be approximated in L-SIG and the other way around.
Theorem 12. R-SIG 6∈ L-SIG and L-SIG 6∈ R-SIG.
Proof. Follows from a simple capacity argument. For all n, all the channels in
LOCn(R-SIG) have zero left-capacity, while L-SIG has non-zero left-capacity.
And vice-versa.
B.4 Signalling
We are now ready to define the largest of the non-locality classes SIG. Indeed
every possible strategy is in SIG.
Definition 26. SIG = {U |U ≤LOC SIG} and SIG
poly
= {U |U ≤LOC
poly
SIG}
a //
SIG
boo
b //oo a
Fig. 7. a SIG-box
Definition 27. We say that U Fully Signals (is SIG-verbose) iff U Right Signals
and Left Signals.
B.5 No-Signalling
We finally define the less intuitive non-locality class NOSIG in relation to classes
defined above.
Definition 28. NOSIG = R-SIG
⋂
L-SIG and NOSIG
poly
= R-SIG
poly
⋂
L-SIG
poly
.
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L-SIG R-SIG핊핀픾
핃핆ℂ
ℕ핆핊핀픾
|핃핆ℂ⟩
ℂ핆필핆ℙ
L-핊핀픾 R-핊핀픾
SIG
ID
R BGRBG
PR, ??
??
ℕ픸픻
L-SIG R-SIG핊핀픾
핃핆ℂ
ℕ핆핊핀픾
|핃핆ℂ⟩
ℂ핆필핆ℙ
L-핊핀픾 R-핊핀픾
SIG
ID
PR ??
??
Fig. 8. Non-locality Hierarchy and complete (two-party) distributions in each class.
A similar characterization may be found in [32] Section 3 and [33] Corollary
3.5.
Theorem 13. . The above definition of NOSIG exactly coincides with the tra-
ditional notion of No-Signalling [34].
Intuitively, a distribution P (x, y|a, b) is No-Signalling as long as for every a
the x|b and for every b the y|a channels have zero capacity.
Note: Forster and Wolf [35] have proved that PR (see Fig. 1) is complete
for NOSIG distributions under an asymptotic definition similar to ours.
Fig. 8 shows the relation of these classes as well as the case obtained via
quantum entanglement (|LOC〉) as considered by Bell [27] and via commuting-
operators (COMOP) as defined by Ito, Kobayashi, Preda, Sun, and Yao [36]. We
include those for completeness but will not discuss these particular classes any
further in this work.
Definition 29. We say that U does not Signal iff U does not Right Signal nor
Left Signal iff U ∈ NOSIG.
C Visual description of the new model
C.1 Local Multi-Prover Interactive Proofs
In the Interrogation phase (see Fig. 9) V1, ..., Vk (equipped with an arbitrary
local correlator) individually interrogate P1, ..., Pk (equipped with an arbitrary
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LOC
poly
LOC
P1 V1 V2 P2
V1 V0V2
Fig. 9. Interrogation phase (top) followed by decision phase (bottom).
local correlator). At the end of the interactive part, all the V1, ..., Vk report to
V0 who takes the final decision. The corresponding complexity class is MIP =
MIPLOCLOC
poly
= NEXP.
C.2 Entangled Multi-Prover Interactive Proofs
|LOC〉
poly
|LOC〉
P1 V1 V2 P2
Fig. 10. Interrogation phase.
In the Interrogation phase (see Fig. 10) V1, ..., Vk (equipped with an arbitrary
entangled correlator) individually interrogate P1, ..., Pk (equipped with an arbi-
trary entangled correlator). At the end of the interactive part, all the V1, ..., Vk
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report to V0 who takes the final decision. The corresponding complexity class is
MIP∗ = MIP|LOC〉|LOC〉
poly
⊇ NEXP.
C.3 No-Signalling Multi-Prover Interactive Proofs
NOSIG
poly
NOSIG
P1 V1 V2 P2
Fig. 11. Interrogation phase.
In the Interrogation phase (see Fig. 11) V1, ..., Vk (equipped with an arbitrary
No-Signalling correlator) individually interrogate P1, ..., Pk (equipped with an
arbitrary No-Signalling correlator). At the end of the interactive part, all the
V1, ..., Vk report to V0 who takes the final decision. The corresponding complexity
class is MIPns = MIPNOSIGNOSIG
poly
= EXP.
As noted before, most MIPs found in the literature are actually (non-adaptive)
local-verifier MIPs (see Fig. 12) yielding for instance MIPns = MIPNOSIGLOC
poly
.
LOC
poly
NOSIG
P1 V1 V2 P2
Fig. 12. Interrogation phase.
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C.4 A New, Stronger Flavour of Zero-Knowledge
Traditionally zero-knowledge is defined as a property of the honest provers for
all (polynomial-time) verifiers
∀polyV ′ ∃polyS ∀x∈L ∀w VIEWV ′ [P1, ..., Pk, V ′](w, x) = S(w, x).
However, in the present context, the fact that the simulation of V ′’s view via
a single centralized simulator S, achieving zero-knowledge is rather easy because
such an S can cheat the binding property of the commitments at will. The
intuition behind the original definition is that the verifier is unable to convince a
third party (a Judge J0) because the VIEW he reports (see Fig. 13) could have
been equally created (with the same distribution) by a simulator. Nevertheless,
a stronger flavour of zero-knowledge is achieved if the simulator is not invoking
its full signalling power whenever the verifier does not use such power.
J0V
′
w
Fig. 13. (Interac/Simula)tion-Distinction phase.
For all non-locality levels starting with Ŝ and up, the simulators Si do not
need more non-local power than the verifiers V ′i . The ultimate (strongest) notion
of “LOC
poly
-local ZK” being ZK
poly
LOC because at all levels V ′ is simulated by a
simulator with no extra non-local power, whereas at the opposite end of the
spectrum ZK
poly
SIG is what is generally considered zero-knowledge with a single
simulator or a group of signalling simulators.
This stronger notion of zero-knowledge is particularly interesting in the rel-
ativistic bit-commitment scenario where a pair of judges may provide separate
auxiliary-inputs to spatially separated verifiers pretending to be speaking to
powerful provers. If the verifiers can report their conversation fast enough to the
judges (but not interact with the judges however), they must be able to do so
without invoking signalling because of the distance separating them. If a pair of
simulators can produce the same distribution of views in the same context, we
obtain a stronger flavour of zero-knowledge (See Fig. 14).
The results of this paper, depending on the specific bit commitment used,
may be achieved under a stronger flavour of zero-knowledge if a member of the
non-locality class Ŝ is enough to break the binding property of the commitments.
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|LOC〉
V̂′
V ′1 V
′
2
J1 J2
w1 w2
|LOC〉
Ŝ
⋃
V̂′
S1 S2J1 J2
w1 w2
J1 J2 J0
w1, w2
Fig. 14. Interrogation or Simulation phase (top) followed by Distinction phase (bot-
tom).
For instance, the result of section 5.1 is really ZK
poly
NOSIGMIPLOCLOC
poly
= NEXP al-
though existing proofs usually mean ZK
poly
SIGMIPLOCLOC
poly
= NEXP. Using the bit
commitment scheme based on the magic square game of [28] we can also obtain
ZK
poly
|LOC〉MIPLOCLOC
poly
= NEXP.
Some interesting questions resulting from this definition is whether any higher
class such as ZK
poly
LOCMIPLOCLOC
poly
or ZK
poly
NOSIGMIPNOSIGNOSIG
poly
contains more than the nat-
ural examples such as GRAPH ISO or CODE EQUIV already found in the most
natural class ZK
poly
SIGMIPSIGSIG
poly
= ZKIP.
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C.5 A note on notation
ZKSMIPPV
is the complexity class of Zero-Knowledge Multi-provers Interactive Proofs where
(honest and dishonest) provers are restricted to non-locality class P (important
for soundness), where the honest verifier is from non-locality class V (also im-
portant for soundness), and where the Zero-Knowledge simulators are from non-
locality class S unless V̂ ′ is outside of S in which case they are from the class of
V̂ ′.
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